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The Shield and the Sword: The Press 
Between the Public Interest and the Illegal 
Interception of Private Communications 
by ANDRES CALDERON+ 
Abstract 
Journalism is not only under the attack of fake news and post-truth 
politics. Its main enemy comes from within. Malpractices of journalism such 
as the fabrication of sources, fake stories, and illegal intrusion in people’s 
privacy, are part of the equation that leads to people’s distrust in news 
organization. 
This article addresses two very related topics that, nevertheless, have 
not been sufficiently studied as part of the same phenomenon: The reporter’s 
privilege to protect his sources’ identity and its connection with a journalist’s 
involvement in the illegal hacking or interception of private 
communications. 
After reviewing the most relevant case law from the federal and state 
level, and all states that have enacted a Shield Law, the author recommends 
an exception to the reporter’s privilege when there is probable cause that the 
journalist participated in illegal gathering activities of secluded information. 
With this proposal, the purpose is to reconcile two of the most emblematic 
legal precedents for freedom of the press by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
Branzburg and Bartnicki. 
 
Keywords: Shield Law, Reporter’s privilege, Sources, Journalism, 
Fake News, Hacking, Intrusion, Freedom of the press 
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Introduction 
Reporter’s privilege, i.e., the right of a journalist to refuse to disclose 
his confidential sources, is based on the idea of giving the press enough 
breathing space to investigate and communicate events of public interest, 
which would otherwise remain hidden or unobserved. 
But what happens when the reporter’s privilege is used not to protect a 
source but to conceal the ill motivations of the journalist itself? What if there 
is no real source? Or if there is one who colluded with the reporter in the 
illegal procurement of private or secluded information? Several scandals, 
like the News of the World phone hacking case,1 or the Claas Relotious 
fabricated stories and interviewees saga,2 have exacted a heavy toll on 
journalism, due to the proliferation of fake news and distrust in recent years. 
This paper deals with this conflict, between freedom of the press and 
privacy in the context of two conflicting legal rules: one that allows the press 
to divulge private information, and one that forbids the illegal interception 
of private communications. 
A paradox can surely arise in some scenarios, in which the reporter’s 
privilege and the prosecution of wrongdoers might conflict. For instance, 
while public interest would justify the press’ disclosure of wiretapped phone 
conversations between two private parties under the ruling of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper,3 warrantless phone wiretapping still 
remains a crime under federal and most state statutes. In this context, the 
reporter’s privilege could work as an obstacle to the prosecution of the 
wrongdoers responsible for the illegal intrusion and create a vicious circle. 
Under Bartnicki, illegal interceptors would still have a market (i.e., 
journalists) to “sell” or “donate” the results of their illicit “work,” and under 
a Shield law, their identity would be protected. 
Bartnicki involved the disclosure of the content of a wiretapped private 
phone conversation, an illegal activity under State Law (Pennsylvania) and 
Federal Law.4 However, considering that the press was not involved in the 
illegal interception, and that the recorded conversation was of public 
concern, the majority of the Supreme Court ruled (6 to 3) that the press’ 
broadcasting of the conversation was protected by the First Amendment.5 
 
 1.  Phone-hacking trial explained, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-24894403. 
 2.  Kate Conolly, Der Spiegel says top journalist faked stories for years, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/19/top-der-spiegel-journalist-resi 
gns-over-fake-interviews. 
 3.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 4.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). 
 5.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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In another much-disputed case, Branzburg v. Hayes,6 the Supreme 
Court refused (5 to 4) to interpret the First Amendment in such a way as to 
grant reporters a special testimonial privilege preventing them from 
responding to grand jury subpoenas within an investigation of the 
commission of a crime. Nevertheless, a general clear-cut rule was not 
established and several lower courts have recognized a constitutional 
reporter’s privilege, supporting their reasoning in the dissenting votes in 
Branzburg, and the concurring vote of Justice Powell, who asserted that 
under some circumstances newsmen could succeed in quashing a subpoena 
under the First Amendment. Furthermore, forty states have already enacted 
shield laws and several bills with a similar purpose have been filed in the 
Federal Congress.7 
Branzburg and Bartnicki are two Supreme Court cases that accurately 
exemplify the pendulous approach that courts have toward the press’ role 
with respect to illegally obtained or disclosed information. The different 
outcomes from lower courts’ case law show that one-size-fits-all solutions 
may not be adequate for addressing the press’ privileges when they involve 
the interception of private communications. Nevertheless, some basic rules 
and guidelines would be helpful in a case-by-case analysis. 
Taking this into consideration, in this paper I will review the statutory 
provisions and case law involving these two aspects of the media endeavors 
and propose a specific exception to the protection from shield laws: When 
there is probable cause to believe that the journalist took part in the illegal 
interception of a private or secluded communication. This alternative aims 
to reconcile the competing interests of newsgathering and privacy protection, 
by deterring the illegal intrusion into private conversations while 
maintaining the right of the press to disseminate truthful, legally-obtained, 
newsworthy information. 
In the first part of this paper, I will review the statutory provisions that 
protect people from illegal interception in their private communications and 
the Bartnicki exception favoring the press’ disclosure of its content. The 
study of part I is also directed to show the incomplete solution that the 
Bartnicki rule provides to the problem of illegal interception and possible 
involvement of the press in this activity. Part II is dedicated to the study of 
the reporter’s privilege and to the complications that its misuse, from both 
sources and the press, may present. In part III, I will trace out the connection 
between the reporter’s privilege and the disclosure of information illegally 
obtained by intercepting private communications in order to propose an 
 
 6.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 7.  Number of states with shield law climbs to 40, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-law-sum 
mer-2011/number-states-shield-law-climbs (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
4 - CALDERON_CMT_V42-2 (DO NOT DELECT) 4/8/2020  12:00 PM 
196 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [42:2 
exception to be included in a model shield law, after reviewing the shield 
laws from the 40 states that have enacted one and the most relevant case law. 
This will be followed by a brief conclusion. 
It could be argued that press self-regulation could be a more suitable 
and First-Amendment-deferential approach to address this problem, and that 
media outlets are in better position to determine whether to disclose or not 
illegally obtained private information, and when to grant or not 
confidentiality to a source. The aforementioned scandals, however, show 
that self-regulation may sometimes be a weak solution for these kinds of 
cases (and possibly some more cases yet to be uncovered), even less when 
the press itself is intertwined with the criminals. Therefore, it might still be 
necessary to pursue a better balance of the interests and incentives in play. 
Illegal Interception and the Press’ Disclosure 
The proliferation of wiretapping devices and bugs has prompted privacy 
concerns that have been addressed first by the Courts and then by the 
Congress. 
In the seminal case Olmstead v. United States,8 the Supreme Court 
decided on a case of a warrantless phone wiretapping that was made by 
federal officers without trespassing the property of the investigated people 
(the officers had inserted wires along the ordinary telephone wires in the 
basement of a building, and the taps were made in the street near the 
residences).9 Because of the particular circumstances of the wiretapping, the 
Supreme Court majority ruled that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis declared that government intrusion 
with people’s privacy may adopt new forms in the future (“The progress of 
science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely 
to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce 
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most 
intimate occurrences of the home”).10 This dynamic view of the Constitution, 
which should keep pace with technological change, would later prevail. In 
1934, the Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 
making phone wiretapping a federal crime.11 
 
 8.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 9.  Id. at 456-57. 
 10.  Id. at 474. 
 11.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
145 (3d ed. 2011). 
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Later on, in Katz v. United States,12 the Supreme Court would abandon 
the “physical trespass” doctrine set in Olmstead and Goldman13 as a 
parameter to determine a violation to the Fourth Amendment. In Katz the 
majority opinion of the Court established the illegality of a wiretap over a 
public telephone booth without a search warrant. Justice Harlan’s concurring 
vote in this case provided with the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
that would be widely cited by the courts in future cases as the bounds of the 
Fourth Amendment protection.14 
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was the first federal 
statute limiting the interception and disclosure of private electronic 
communications, stating that: 
 
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept 
any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, 
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 
intercepted communication to any person . . . No person having 
received any intercepted radio communication or having become 
acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or 
meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) knowing 
that such communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish 
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of 
such communication (or any part thereof) or use such 
communication (or any information therein contained) for his own 
benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.15 
 
In 1968, in response to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Katz and 
Berger,16 the Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act, whose Title III—commonly referred to as the “Federal Wiretap Act”—
extended its reach beyond § 605, also criminalizing private wiretaps.17 This 
statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520, makes it a crime to intercept “any 
wire or oral communication” punishable with up to five years imprisonment 
and $10,000 fine. However, it is not unlawful when a person, who is a party 
to the communication, is making the recording.18 
 
 12.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 13.  Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 14.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (1967).  
 15.  47 U.S.C. § 605(a)(6).  
 16.  Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 17.  Solove & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 147. 
 18.  Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2018). See also DWIGHT L. TEETER & BILL 
LOVING, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 
MEDIA 469 (13th ed. 2011); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 151. 
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The federal statute, as many state laws currently do, forbids not only the 
actual wiretapping or eavesdropping, but also the use and disclosure of 
intercepted communication by third parties when the disclosing party knows 
or has reason to know that it was illegally obtained.19 
In 1986, Congress made some amendments to the federal wiretap law 
by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Wire 
Electronic Communications Act, commonly referred together as the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). The ECPA 
updated the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 to protect wire, oral, and electronic 
communications while those communications are being made, are in transit, 
and when they are stored on computers. The Act applies to email, telephone 
conversations, and data stored electronically. Title III of the Federal Wiretap 
Act of 1968 was then shifted to Title I.20 
Section 2518 of the 18 U.S.C. sets the general procedure to obtain the 
authorization from a judge to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication. This section also establishes that any aggrieved person may 
move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted 
or evidence derived therefrom if the communication was unlawfully 
intercepted, the authorization was insufficient or if the interception did not 
follow the procedure and instructions of the order of authorization.21 This 
stipulation follows a “fruit of the poisonous tree” norm, banning the use of 
the intercepted communication even if it would arguably be beneficial for 
legal social ends.22 
The federal statute, as well as several state laws, prohibit not only the 
unauthorized interception of private communications, but also penalize the 
disclosure of the information contained in those communications, a 
restriction that has a strong impact on journalistic activities and the First 
Amendment. 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed this matter in its famous 
Bartnicki v. Vopper ruling in 2001.23 This case dealt with the possibility of 
imposing liability on the media for publication of an illegally recorded 
cellular phone conversation, which was not actually recorded by the media. 
 
 19.  Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2018). See also FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS 
MEDIA LAW. CASES AND MATERIALS 416 (8th ed. 2011). 
 20.  Federal Statutes relevant in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, http://www.it.ojp.gov/default.aspx? 
area=privacy&page=1285 (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 21.  18 U.S.C § 2518(10)(a) (1998). 
 22.  Cf. Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability 
for Trafficking In Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1133 (2002). 
 23.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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The conversation was between Anthony F. Kane Jr., president of the 
West Wyoming Valley Teachers Union and Gloria Bartnicki, the teachers’ 
union chief negotiator. In this conversation, besides critical commentaries 
about the school board members and their reluctance to give raises to the 
teachers, Kane made some threatening comments: “If they’re not gonna 
move for three percent, we’re gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . to 
blow off their front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those 
guys.”24 
A tape of the recorded conversation was found by Jack Yocum, 
president of the local taxpayers’ association, in his mailbox, who gave it to 
Frederick W. Vopper, a WILK radio talk show host, who aired the recording 
in violation of the Federal and the State of Pennsylvania Wiretap Acts. 
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court took into consideration that, 
despite the fact that the respondents (Vopper and Yocum) had at least reason 
to know that the recording itself was unlawful, they did not take part in the 
illegal interception, they lawfully accessed to the information on the tapes 
and the subject matter of the conversation was of public concern.25 
The Court properly identified the conflict between allowing the 
publication of truthful and newsworthy information by the media and the 
interests served by the Federal Law prohibition, which consisted of removing 
the incentives for parties to intercept private conversations. Because such 
information would not be lawfully available for public dissemination, 
therefore the harm to persons whose conversations were illegally intercepted 
would be minimized.26 The Court, however, rejected (6-3) the idea of 
punishing the person who did not participate in the illegal interception but 
did disclose the intercepted communication. The Court stated that the normal 
method for deterrence was to punish the perpetrator of the illegality (i.e., 
whoever first recorded the conversation), and then took into consideration 
the absence of empirical evidence to support the argument that punishing the 
innocent discloser would reduce the number of illegal interceptions.27 
In this case, the Court held that “privacy concerns give way when 
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance,”28 
and refused to decide whether the interests protected by the Federal Statute 
were strong enough to justify punishment in a case in which the disclosure 
involved trade secrets or information of purely private concern.29 
 
 24.  Id. at 518-19.  
 25.  Id. at 524-25. 
 26.  Id. at 516. 
 27.  Id. at 529-32. 
 28.  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 516. 
 29.  Id. at 533-534. 
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Before Bartnicki, the Supreme Court had admitted the right of the press 
to publish, without punishment, truthful information, with the caveat that the 
information in those previous cases was not preceded by an illegal 
intrusion.30 In The Florida Star v.B.J.F., the Court ruled in favor of a 
newspaper that had published the name of a rape victim that was 
inadvertently disclosed by the police.31 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn was a 
similar case of publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from judicial 
records.32 In Smith v. Daily Mail, the Court held that the West Virginia 
statute that made it a crime for newspapers to publish the name of any youth 
charged as a juvenile offender violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
in prohibiting truthful publication of information lawfully obtained by 
newspapers by monitoring police band radio frequency and interviewing 
eyewitnesses.33 Similarly, in Landmark Communications v. Virginia, the 
Court ruled that the First Amendment does not permit criminal punishment 
of the news media for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding 
confidential proceedings from the Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission.34 
But Bartnicki was a particular case in which an illegal intrusion was 
performed, and even though the news media was not the perpetrator, it did 
know or had reason to know of this illegality. Furthermore, this case 
presented the Court with the particular interest of the States and of the 
Federal Government in stopping the illegal interception of private 
conversations, an activity of permanent interest for media organizations. 
The dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist put more 
weight on the deterrence effect that arises from the prohibition on 
disseminating the information. The “dry-up-the-market” theory behind the 
prohibition prevents the wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of the crime: 
 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than essential to further the interest of protecting the 
privacy of individual communications. Were there no prohibition 
on disclosure, an unlawful eavesdropper who wanted to disclose 
the conversation could anonymously launder the interception 
through a third party and thereby avoid detection. Indeed, demand 
for illegally obtained private information would only increase if it 
could be disclosed without repercussion. “The law against 
 
 30.  Cf. Smolla, supra note 22, at 1128. 
 31.  The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 32.  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 33.  Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
 34.  Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
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interceptions, which the Court agrees is valid, would be utterly 
ineffectual without these antidisclosure provisions.”35 
 
However, the alleged causal link between surreptitious illegal electronic 
surveillance and the opportunity to sell or donate this information is very 
difficult to prove. It is unknown how many illegal intrusions go unnoticed 
and how many of these intrusions end up with the public dissemination of 
the information contained therein. Nevertheless, it is a reasonable 
assumption that the complete absence of liability on the media to disclose 
this illegally obtained material may create the incentives for the invasion.36 
In Bartnicki, the Supreme Court answered positively the question of 
whether we, as a society, do or do not want a press that publishes truthful 
and newsworthy information, even if such information was illegally obtained 
by a third party. Nonetheless, the remaining question was: Do we want to 
encourage third parties’ access to that information by using illegal means? 
The answer, I would bet, is no, we do not. All of the Justices in Bartnicki 
agreed that there is a compelling interest by the Federal and State 
Governments to deter this kind of crime; the disagreement was on the tools 
to achieve that goal. 
Notwithstanding the First Amendment argument to protect news media 
when they choose to disclose this type of information, the courts do not grant 
this protection to sources who have either illegally obtained or illegally 
transmitted that information to the press. 
For instance, in Boehner v. McDermott,37 the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit refused to grant a Congressman a First Amendment protection 
for the disclosure of illegally obtained information. In this case, James A. 
McDermott, a member of the House of Representatives and member of 
Congressional Ethics Committee, gave to the media a record of a phone 
conference between fellow Congressman, John A. Boehner, and Newt 
Gingrich, member of the Republican Party leadership and then Speaker of 
the House, who was under investigation before the Committee. Citizens John 
and Alice Martin were responsible for eavesdropping on the conversation 
using a police radio scanner in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and for 
delivering the recording to McDermott. The majority opinion of the Court 
held that even when McDermott did not participate in the interception of the 
conversation and that the information therein contained had substantial news 
value (revealing information on whether Gingrich had violated his settlement 
agreement with the Ethics Committee), he still was subject to the Committee 
 
 35.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 551 (2001).  
 36.  Cf. Smolla, supra note 22, at 1140. 
 37.  Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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rule prohibiting disclosure of any evidence relating to an investigation to 
anyone outside the Committee unless authorized: “When Representative 
McDermott became a member of the Ethics Committee, he voluntarily 
accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his receipt and handling of 
the Martins’ illegal recording. He therefore had no First Amendment right to 
disclose the tape to the media.”38 
The Court of Appeals followed in Boehner the criteria established by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Aguilar, in which the Court 
distinguished the impacts on First Amendment coming from voluntary and 
involuntary nondisclosure obligations: “As to one who voluntarily assumed 
a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not 
subject to the same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose 
restrictions on unwilling members of the public . . . We think the 
Government’s interest is quite sufficient to justify the construction of the 
statute as written, without any artificial narrowing because of First 
Amendment concerns.”39 
This distinction explains why, while the press may lawfully publish 
leaked information, leakers who violate a voluntary non-disclosure 
obligation may still be held responsible for breaking their duty of secrecy. 
Similarly, in Landmark, the Supreme Court declared that the First 
Amended prevented them from applying criminal punishment to the news 
media for divulging or publishing truthful information about proceedings of 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, despite its confidentiality.40 In 
that case, instead of holding the press liable, the Supreme Court put the 
responsibility for disclosing confidential information on the shoulders of the 
party responsible for safeguarding its secrecy: “Much of the risk can be 
eliminated through careful internal procedures to protect the confidentiality 
of Commission proceedings.”41 
The irony does not go unnoticed. As a society, we want a free press to 
publish truthful and newsworthy information, but we still want to reprimand 
illegal disclosure or acquisition of information. We want to punish the illegal 
interceptor or the leaking source, but we refuse to punish the reporter who 
obtains the information from the wrongdoer. Stone et al. recognize this 
possible contradiction in encouraging a source to provide illegally obtained 
 
 38.  Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 39.  United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995). 
 40.  Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
 41.  Id. at 845. 
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information to a journalist—thanks to the reporter’s privilege—and, at the 
same time, punishing the leak for disclosing confidential information.42 
An adequate regulation of the reporter’s privilege could play a major 
role in finding a balance between those conflicting interests. 
II.   Reporter’s Privilege and Its Misuse 
It is well-known that journalists have a special privilege that prevents 
them from being subpoenaed in judicial proceedings (civil, criminal and 
grand juries) and especially from being forced to disclose the identity of their 
sources. This protection, known as reporter’s privilege, is recognized in the 
vast majority of the states, but its roots are found in common law. 
The first time the reporter’s privilege was asserted in court was in 1848, 
when New York Herald’s reporter John Nugent refused to disclose who had 
given him a copy of a proposed treaty to end the Mexican-American War, 
which was being secretly debated in the Senate at the time. Nugent refused 
to disclose his source and was cited for contempt. Similar cases arose 
throughout the 1800s, but courts generally rejected reporters’ arguments for 
the necessity of maintaining confidential the identity of the sources.43 
While history shows many examples of reporters’ defiance to disclose 
the identity of their sources, it is a historical fact that judges did not use to 
grant the privilege to journalists, at least not expressly, mainly because of 
two reasons: The privilege would restrict the flow of evidence at trial, and 
the idea that this protection would not necessarily improve the free flow of 
accurate information.44 
In 1896, Maryland became the first state to offer a protection to 
journalists after a Baltimore Sun reporter was jailed for failing to disclose the 
identity of a source who leaked information about grand jury proceedings. 
That case resulted in the adoption of the country’s first shield law, which 
provided an absolute privilege against disclosure of a source’s identity in any 
legal proceeding.45 
It was not until 1972, however, when the Supreme Court ruled on the 
most important case concerning the reporter’s privilege, Branzburg v. Hayes, 
which arose from four different cases of reporters petitioning to quash 
subpoenas. The first two cases concerned Branzburg, a staff reporter for the 
 
 42.  Stone et al., The First Amendment 500 (3d ed. 2008). See also, NORMAN PEARLSTINE, 
OFF THE RECORD: THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE WAR OVER ANONYMOUS SOURCES 
151 (2007). 
 43.  Michelle C. Gabriel, Plugging Leaks: The Necessity of Distinguishing Whistleblowers 
and Wrongdoers in the Free Flow of Information Act, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 531, 537 (2009). 
 44.  Paul Marcus, The Reporter’s Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzberg v. 
Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 816-18 (1983). 
 45.  See Gabriel, supra note 43, at 538. 
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Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky, who 
was subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury to identify the two 
residents he had seen making hashish from marihuana and written about. In 
a later story, Branzburg wrote about the use of drugs in Frankfort, Kentucky, 
after interviewing several dozen drug users. Branzburg was also subpoenaed 
to appear before a Franklin County grand jury, and he moved to quash the 
summons. In a third case, petitioner Pappas, a television newsman-
photographer working out of the Providence, Rhode Island, office of a New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, television station, recorded and photographed a 
prepared statement read by one of the Black Panther leaders, but after an 
expected police raid that never occurred, he did not write a story nor did he 
reveal what had occurred in the Black Panther’s headquarters. Two months 
later, Pappas was summoned before the Bristol County grand jury but 
refused to answer any questions about what had taken place inside the 
headquarters while he was in there. In the fourth case, Earl Caldwell, a 
reporter for the New York Times, was also subpoenaed by a federal grand 
jury in the Northern District of California to testify and to bring with him 
notes and tape recordings of interviews he had with officers and spokesmen 
of the Black Panther Party concerning the aims, purposes, and activities of 
that organization.46 
The Supreme Court had to decide whether requiring newsmen to appear 
and testify before state or federal grand juries curtailed the freedom of speech 
and of the press established in the First Amendment. The majority opinion 
held it did not.47 
The majority vote in Branzburg stated that the First Amendment did not 
“invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the 
enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”48 This was 
an implication of the general principle that “(t)he publisher of a newspaper 
has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no 
special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.”49 To the Court, 
news reporting has no precedence over the interest in identifying criminal 
activities in which may be engaged the very sources journalists are writing 
about: “We cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment 
protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his 
source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime 
than to do something about it.”50 
 
 46.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667-82 (1972). 
 47.  Id. at 667. 
 48.  Id. at 682. 
 49.  Id. at 682-83. 
 50.  Id. at 692. 
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The majority of the Supreme Court also acknowledged the possible 
effects that its ruling could have on the flow of information between 
journalists and its sources, but was skeptical about a direct negative effect: 
But we remain unclear how often and to what extent informers are 
actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to 
testify before a grand jury. The available data indicate that some newsmen 
rely a great deal on confidential sources and that some informants are 
particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is 
held by this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to 
subpoenas, but the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a 
significant construction of the flow of news to the public if this Court 
reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the 
testimonial obligations of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of 
such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosures to 
newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative.51 
It is interesting to note that the Court in Bartnicki followed a similar 
reasoning as it had in Branzburg thirty years before. In both Branzburg and 
Bartnicki, the Court took into consideration a legitimate specific purpose (to 
encourage sources to speak freely with reporters and to eliminate the 
incentives of illegal interceptors of private communications, respectively), 
but refused to validate one specific solution (a general exception for reporters 
from testifying before a grand jury and the proscription on the dissemination 
by the press of the information illegally obtained by a third party, 
respectively) because of the uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of that 
alternative. 
The dissenting vote written by Justice Stewart in Branzburg, joined by 
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, criticized the majority’s reliance on 
empirical studies to protect First Amendment rights, and instead founded the 
need of special safeguards on common sense.52  Justice Stewart proposed a 
balancing test in order to defeat the reporter’s privilege. Therefore, in order 
to have a reporter reveal confidences before a grand jury, the government 
must: 
 
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the 
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific 
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information 
sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of 
 
 51.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972). 
 52.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 711-52 (1972). Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissenting 
opinion. 
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First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and 
overriding interest in the information.53 
 
This test has been followed by a large amount of lower courts and state 
legislations that have recognized a reporter’s privilege, as explained in part 
III. The majority opinion won, however, with the concurring vote of Justice 
Powell, who did not reject the claim of a privilege. Instead, the concurring 
Justice interpreted the majority’s opinion not to impede the recognition of a 
constitutional right for a newsman with respect to the gathering of news and 
the safeguarding of his sources,54 which opened a door to the admission of 
the reporter’s privilege under different circumstances.55 Good faith on the 
part of the grand jury investigation would play a key role in determining if a 
newsman’s rights are violated or not according to Justice Powell,56 an 
assessment that calls for a case-by-case analysis: 
 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts 
by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press 
and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with 
respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital 
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis 
accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such 
questions. In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under 
circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require 
protection.57 
 
It is true that all of the Justices agreed on the need for some 
newsgathering protection for the furtherance of the press’ freedom.58 Despite 
the fact that the majority opinion held that in the case of Branzburg there was 
not a right of a newsman to refuse to answer to a grand jury’s summons, the 
concurrent vote of Justice Powell has been interpreted by lower courts as a 
majority (5 votes) on the recognition of a reporter’s privilege. In opposition, 
 
 53.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, at 743. 
 54.  Id. at 709. 
 55.  See David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 891 
(2009). 
 56.  See David Abramowicz, Calculating The Public Interest In Protecting Journalists’ 
Confidential Sources, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1949, 1958 (2008) (“The only exception to the rule 
rejecting the privilege, the Branzburg Court said, would arise if grand jury proceedings were 
instituted in bad faith. (. . .) Thus, if a reporter is subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury, 
and the subpoena is issued in good faith, a federal judge will tip the balance in favor of compelling 
the reporter to testify.”).  
 57.  Branzburg, 408 U.S.665, at 710. 
 58.  See Anderson, supra note 55, at 909. 
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former judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, has rejected 
the idea of a reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment and has 
criticized how lower courts have essentially ignored the majority opinion in 
Branzburg or “audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a 
reporter’s privilege.”59 
This ambiguity has led many lower courts to create the protection as 
they thought necessary, although most of them have followed the balancing 
test of Justice Stewart’s dissent.60 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) shows that 
currently 40 states, plus the District of Columbia, have enacted a shield law 
to protect a journalist from mandatory disclosure of information before a 
judicial proceeding, in some fashion.61 After reviewing the information 
pertaining to each individual state, I found that 48 states, plus D.C., 
recognize some kind of reporter’s privilege either by state law, common law, 
or under the First Amendment. 
Notwithstanding the widespread protection of journalists’ sources, 
several jurisdictions also recognize exceptions to the privilege and on many 
occasions journalists have been subpoenaed in the course of civil and 
criminal proceedings and before grand juries as well. In a five-year study on 
the incidence of subpoenas served on the news media, Agents of Discovery, 
the RCFP reported that 1,326 subpoenas were served on 440 news 
 
 59.  McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). See also Anderson, supra note 
55, at 894. 
 60.  See Anderson, supra note 55, at 889-890; Jonathan Peters, WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify 
to Claim Federal Reporter’s Privilege in Any Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 674 (2010-2011). In 
an opposite direction, see the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United 
States v. Sterling. The Court ruled that there was not a reporter’s privilege under First Amendment, 
State or Common Law “from being compelled to testify by the prosecution or the defense in 
criminal proceedings about criminal conduct that the reporter personally witnessed or participated.” 
United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492 (4th Cir. 2013). The case was about the motion of a 
reporter, James Risen, to quash a subpoena requiring his testimony about the identity of a 
confidential source that had revealed to him national defense information in violation of the 
Espionage Act. The subpoena was issued in the criminal case in which Jeffrey Sterling, a former 
CIA agent, was indicted for revealing information regarding a covert CIA operation pertaining to 
the Iranian nuclear weapons operation to the journalist James Risen.  
The Court established that there was a “compelling public interest in effective criminal 
investigation and prosecution” (United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 498 (4th Cir. 2013)) of 
higher weight than in civil cases, and read Branzburg as not creating a reporter’s immunity. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that like the Branzburg reporters, “Risen has ‘direct information . . . 
concerning the commission of serious crimes’ and that “he can provide the only first-hand account 
of the commission of a most serious crime indicted by the grand jury—the illegal disclosure of 
classified, national security information by one who was entrusted by our government to protect 
national security, but who is charged with having endangered it instead.” United States v. Sterling, 
724 F.3d 482, 498 (4th Cir. 2013). Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s decision 
and refused to grant Risen a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege. 
 61.  Number of states with shield law climbs to 40, supra note 7.  
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organizations in 1999, and forty-six percent of all news media responding 
said they received at least one subpoena during 1999.62 
A more recent study conducted by Andersen revealed that 761 
responding news organizations participating in the study reported that their 
“reporters, editors or other news employees” received a total of 3,062 
“subpoenas seeking information or material relating to newsgathering” in 
2006. The study made an estimate of 7,244 subpoenas received by all daily 
newspapers and network-affiliated television news operations in the United 
States that year.63 
The RCFP has also drafted a list of all 1,778 cases (until May 2019) in 
which a federal entity (from the Executive branch, Congress or the courts) 
has formally investigated or prosecuted someone for the unauthorized 
disclosure of government information to the news media.64 Leak cases are 
the archetype of confidential sources that should be protected by the 
reporter’s privilege. 
When required to reveal their confidential sources, most journalists 
acknowledge their obligation to protect them, even if threatened with jail 
time. The RCFP itself recognizes this is a question of journalism ethics that 
presents the additional complication of having a confidential source suing a 
reporter or his news organization if they do not live up to their confidentiality 
promise.65 The survey conducted by Andersen is also revealing in this 
regard: Only 29 newspapers and 20 broadcasters declared that the threat or 
use of subpoenas against their news organization affected their policy on the 
use of confidential sources. When generalized to the wider population, the 
data collected by Andersen suggests that only an estimated 6.1% of news 
organizations in the country are affected in their confidential-source policy 
by the threat or use of subpoenas.66 
The media industry has been campaigning for a federal shield law for 
several years, but in the meantime it is a general practice that journalists will 
refuse to comply with subpoenas seeking to disclose their confidential 
sources and even spend some time in jail when they are found in contempt 
with a court order. 
 
 62.  The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-to-the-reporters-privilege-compen 
dium/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 63.  RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas 
Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 626 (2008). 
 64.  Katie Beth Nichols, Federal Cases Involving Unauthorized Disclosures to the News 
Media, 1778 to the Present, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.rcfp.org/resources/leak-investigations-chart/. 
 65.  See The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, supra note 62. 
 66.  See Jones, supra note 60, at 650-651. 
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This particular view, as described before, has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Branzburg and also in subsequent cases. Cohen v. Cowles 
Media67 is a clear example of general applicability of rules to the press.68 The 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent a plaintiff 
from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a 
newspaper’s breach of a promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in 
exchange for information.69 As has been correctly expressed by Fargo, the 
First Amendment applies to the institutional press in the same way that it 
applies to all persons.70 Even when the scope of the First Amendment 
protection may reach newsgathering activities, it is not a valid defense for 
violation of the law, whether this violation consists of trespassing,71 intrusion 
into a space of reasonable expectation of privacy,72 or secret recording after 
getting access to a person’s house or office using deceptive methods.73 “The 
 
 67.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). 
 68.  See also Associated Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (“It 
is, therefore, beyond dispute that “[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the 
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.”) 
 69.  Cohen, 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991). 
 70.  Cf. Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in 
States Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 244 (2002). 
 71.  See Teeter & Loving, supra note 18, at 457 (using the example of trespass, the authors 
remind that when a member of the news media enters a property without the owner’s consent, 
trespass occurs, and newsgathering is not a defense, not matter how relevant was the matter). 
 72.  In the famous case of Shulman v. Group W, the Supreme Court of California ruled that 
while there was no expectation of privacy from Ruth Shulman and her son Wayne at the scene of 
her car accident in a highly traveled interstate highway, once inside the rescue helicopter, they did 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore, the use of a hidden microphone by the nurse 
in the helicopter, with the collaboration and purpose to broadcast the recording on a documentary 
television show, was conduct that could be considered as an actionable intrusion. Shulman v. Group 
W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 494 (Cal. 1998). “The mere fact the intruder was in pursuit of 
a ‘story’ does not, however, generally justify an otherwise offensive intrusion; offensiveness 
depends as well on the particular method of investigation used. At one extreme, “‘routine . . . 
reporting techniques,’” such as asking questions of people with information (“including those with 
confidential or restricted information”) could rarely, if ever, be deemed an actionable intrusion. 
[citation and internal quotation marks omitted]. At the other extreme, violation of well-established 
legal areas of physical or sensory privacy—trespass into a home or tapping a personal telephone 
line, for example—could rarely, if ever, be justified by a reporter’s need to get the story. Such acts 
would be deemed highly offensive even if the information sought was of weighty public concern; 
they would also be outside any protection the Constitution provides to newsgathering.” Id. 
The California Supreme Court has also found there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
work place. In Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, ABC reporter Stacy Lescht, who 
had obtained employment as a “telepsychic” with the Psychic Marketing Group (PMG) secretly 
recorded her coworker, tele-psychic Mark Sanders, using a small video camera hidden in her hat.  
Although, this conversation could be seen or overheard by coworkers, the California Supreme 
Court found that nevertheless, Sanders had a reasonable expectation of limited privacy, that his 
conversation with a coworker was not being videotaped. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 
978 P.2d 67, 68-80 (Cal. 1999). 
 73.  In Dietemann v. Time, the 9th Circuit established that the media did not have a special 
right to break laws during its newsgathering activities. In this case that involved a couple of 
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First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by 
electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or office.”74 
Norman Pearlstine, former editor in chief of Time magazine, sees the 
time journalists serve in prison as a reflection of the fact that they are not 
above the law, beyond what some might believe.75 For Pearlstine, the 
importance of civil disobedience is not properly understood by all 
journalists. This case of conflict between the ethical obligations of their 
profession and the Law should be extremely exceptional,76 but as a general 
rule, most journalists would refuse to comply with a subpoena. 
Pearlstine was harshly criticized by the majority of the media outlets 
because of his decision to comply when he was the editor of Time with the 
District Court’s order to turn over Matt Cooper’s notes that revealed the 
identity of his source in the Valerie Plame case. Pearlstine and Time were 
accused of diminishing the value of their journalist’s vow of secrecy to a 
source.77 In opposition, fewer people supported the message behind that 
decision, arguing that the long-term harm to public respect for journalism 
would have been greater if Time had declared that the press is above the 
law.78 
The Valerie Plame story was probably the most publicized case 
involving a reporter’s confidential source. On July 6, 2003, former 
Ambassador Joseph Wilson’s op-ed piece “What I Didn’t Find in Africa” 
 
reporters posing as patients to enter the home of A.A. Dietemann, a journeyman plumberman who 
performed medical services without a diploma or state licenses. The reporters surreptitiously took 
photos and recorded the conversations using a hidden transmitter with the collaboration of the Los 
Angeles County district attorney and the California State Department of Public Health. The Judge 
Shirley Hufstedler writing the majority opinion for the 9th Circuit Court established that: a person 
“does not and should not be required to take the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted 
by photograph or recording, or in our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at 
large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select.” Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 
(9th Cir. 1971). But see the 7th Circuit ruling in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies. In 
this case, Dr J. H. Desnick allowed the videotaping by ABC reporters for the PrimeTime Live 
program of a cataract operation in his clinic’s Chicago office. However, there were also hidden 
cameras and people posing as patients, who were secretly videotaped.The broadcast showed that 
Desnick told some patients to get cataract surgery even though they did not need it in order to 
charge more. But Desnick claims of trespass, fraud and violation of federal and state statutes 
regulating electronic surveillance were dismissed. The Court of Appeals did not value negatively 
the role of investigative journalists breaking their promise to treat their subjects with “kid gloves.” 
The Court said: “If that is ‘fraud,’ it is the kind against which potential victims can arm themselves 
by maintaining a minimum of skepticism about journalistic goals and methods.” Desnick v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, 44 F.3d 1345, 1354-1355 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 74.  Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 75.  See Pearlstine, supra note 42, at 137 (making reference to this attitude from the press, 
which he calls arrogant, and that has contributed to public resentment toward the news media). 
 76.  Id. at 94. 
 77.  Id. at 114-24. 
 78.  Id. at 139-40. 
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appeared in The New York Times, criticizing President Bush’s arguments and 
evidences to support the war with Iraq in his State of the Union speech. In 
response, a couple of governmental officials leaked to the press the name of 
Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, identifying her as an undercover agent 
working for the CIA, in an attempt to discredit Wilson’s selection to his 
mission to Niger to investigate the alleged intents from Iraq to buy significant 
quantities of uranium from Africa. The New York Times’s reporter and 
Pulitzer award winner, Judith Miller, and Time’s reporter Matt Cooper, both 
of whom obtained Plame’s name from governmental leaks,79 were 
subpoenaed by a grand jury at the request of Patrick Fitzgerald, the appointed 
special counsel to investigate the leak of Plame’s identity. Time and Cooper 
were held in contempt for their refusal to testify or produce Cooper’s notes 
arguing for the recognition of a reporter’s privilege, and after losing the 
appeal before the D.C. Court of Appeals and having their petition to the 
Supreme Court to review its ruling in Branzburg denied, Time announced 
that it would comply with the district court order to turn over Cooper’s notes. 
The New York Times and Judith Miller followed a different path and refused 
to testify before the grand jury, which led to Miller’s imprisonment for 85 
days. After that period, Miller agreed to testify after speaking and receiving 
a waiver of confidentiality from her source, I. Lewis Libby, who claimed to 
have given Miller the waiver before she was first imprisoned. In the midst of 
the scandal and criticism about the way Miller and The New York Times had 
played the public opinion about the apparently unneeded protection of a 
confidential source, Miller resigned from The New York Times. On March 6, 
2007, Libby was sentenced to 30 months in prison for lying to investigators 
when he denied that he had told the reporters about Plame, but his prison 
sentence was later commuted by President Bush.80 
It is worth noting that then-Time editor in chief, Norman Pearlstine, at 
one point changed his mind about complying with the order of the Court. In 
the beginning, as he acknowledged in his book “Off the Record,” he was 
willing to have Matt Copper be imprisoned and Time Inc. pay the fines for 
being in contempt with the district court’s order. Time’s Editorial Guidelines 
even prescribed the possibility of serving a jail time for contempt of court.81 
Arguably, the final decision was the result of an assessment on whether this 
case really called for a strong defense of the reporter’s privilege. 
Time’s sources in the Valerie Plame leak, as recognized by Pearlstine, 
did not fit the classical profile of a whistle-blower, who was jeopardizing his 
 
 79.  Only Matt Cooper wrote a piece about the story naming Valerie Plame. 
 80.  Franklin et al., supra note 19, at 486.  
 81.  Pearlstine, supra note 42, at xii. 
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livelihood, his reputation or his life, to expose wrongdoings to the press.82 
Concordantly, Patrick J. Fitzgerald, the appointed special counsel in charge 
of the investigation, stated before Judge Hogan: “We need to step back and 
realize this case is not about a whistle-blower. This case is about potential 
retaliation against a whistle-blower.” In fact, it was later discovered that Vice 
President Cheney got President Bush to declassify intelligence information 
that enabled Libby to use that information (regarding Valerie Plame’s 
identity) when he met Judith Miller.83 
The Valerie Plame leak reveals the excesses that journalists could 
perpetrate. In this kind of cases the protection of sources’ identity not only 
fails to serve a public interest in encouraging the free flow from information 
between whistle-blowers and reporters, but it also damages the reputation of 
the press. 
The case of Dr. Wen Ho Lee is also illustrative of the excesses 
committed by ill-intentioned sources and negligent or overconfident—to say 
the least—journalists. Wen Ho Lee is a Taiwanese-born American citizen 
who worked for the Department of Energy at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory until March of 1999. He was later investigated for allegedly 
stealing American weaponry secrets for China. Details about this 
investigation, as well as information about Lee covered under the Federal 
Privacy Act, were leaked to the media. Although Lee was never charged with 
espionage, he was indicted on fifty-nine counts of mishandling computer 
files at Los Alamos, and pleaded guilty to only one felony charge of 
downloading nuclear weapons data to portable tapes. The leaks aimed to 
damage Wen Ho Lee lacked of substance, and were mainly based on racial 
prejudice. 
In September 2000, during Wen Ho Lee’s plea hearing, Judge Parker of 
the U.S. New Mexico District Court, apologized to Lee for the way his case 
had been handled: “[T]he top decision makers in the executive branch, 
especially the Department of Justice and the Department of Energy . . . have 
caused embarrassment by the way this case began and was handled . . . and 
have embarrassed our entire nation.”84 
Later on, Lee sued the Government for violation of his rights under the 
Privacy Act. Lee’s defense took several depositions from governmental 
officials or their agents to find the leak of his private information, but only 
obtained denials, vague and evasive answers. None of the deponents 
 
 82.  Id. at 100. 
 83.  Id. at 241. 
 84.  Statement by Judge in Los Alamos Case, With Apology for Abuse of Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 14, 2000, at A25. 
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admitted to have personal knowledge of the source of any disclosures.85 
Hence, Lee issued subpoenas duces tecum for the depositions of five 
journalists known to be the authors of published articles containing the 
information about him allegedly disclosed unlawfully by defendants. The 
District Court rejected the request from the journalists to quash the 
subpoenas under Federal Law, ruling that the journalists’ First Amendment 
interest in protecting their confidential news sources was outweighed by 
Lee’s interest in compelling disclosure of sources. Soon after, Lee settled 
with the U.S. Government and major media outlets for more than $1.6 
million.86 
In this case, the absence of a federal shield law and, consequently, the 
absence of a reporter’s privilege, allowed Lee to obtain some compensation. 
But cases like this one are of little help to journalist’s claim of an absolute 
privilege to protect the confidentiality of their sources. Anthony Lewis, 
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and First Amendment scholar, commented 
on the topic: “Suppose that a federal shield law had existed when Wen Ho 
Lee sued to seek some compensation for his nightmare ordeal.  The 
journalists who wrote the damaging stories would have had their subpoenas 
dismissed, and without the names of the leakers Lee would probably have 
had to give up his lawsuit. Is that what a decent society should want? Would 
that have really benefited the press? Or would it have added to the evident 
public feeling that the press is arrogant, demanding special treatment?”87 
The cases of Valerie Plame and Dr. Wen Ho Lee show how 
confidentiality could be used by sources to achieve an evil purpose of 
attacking a person, without evidence to support it. Anonymity granted by 
journalists is the perfect shield. In absence of some limitations, the 
confidentiality rule turns into the perfect channel to perpetrate that kind of 
assaults. This is especially true in defamation cases, when journalists grant 
confidentiality to sources who use it to damage a suspect without any proof 
to back their claims.88 
Confidentiality is a shield to protect whistle-blowers, to help a free flow 
of information between the press and their sources in the search of truth, for 
instance, when exposing government or corporate corruption;89 it is not a 
 
 85.  Lee v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2003) aff’d sub nom. Lee v. 
Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 86.  News Firms Settle with Wen Ho Lee, CBS NEWS (June 2, 2006), https://www.cbsnews. 
com/news/news-firms-settle-with-wen-ho-lee/. 
 87.  ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 93 (2007), quoted by Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s 
Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1341, 1376 (2008). 
 88.  See Pearlstine, supra note 42, at 236. 
 89.  Cf. Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 1954. See also Gabriel, supra note 43, at 531. 
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privilege that comes from the mere conversation between a person and a 
journalist. Sources who attempt to make defamatory claims do not deserve 
the same protection given to a whistle-blower. 
While confidentiality may serve the public interest, this is only possible 
on the notion that the source protected is an honest whistleblower. But 
sometimes, as the cases described above, confidentiality is used to shield the 
powerful from accountability, which also provides sources with a false 
confidence to engage in dangerous speculation,90 and in worse scenarios, to 
disseminate trivial gossip, baseless rumors or malicious assaults.91 Some 
authorities are concerned that sources can learn to “game the system” and in 
fact are more information spinners than actual whistle-blowers.92 
The press also has a big share of responsibility in the misuse of sources’ 
confidentiality. In some cases, negligence or over-confidence lead 
journalists to indiscriminately grant confidential status to some sources in 
not-deserving cases.93 This is especially true in cases of beat reporting, when 
journalists rely on the same sources for story after story and face the risk of 
losing perspective.94 
Pearlstine depicts a journalistic practice in Washington, where reporters 
would often assume the confidentiality of their sources in the Government, 
which seems to show the improper order of interests: In first place, the 
protection afforded to the source, and the protection of the public interest in 
second place.95 The confidentiality condition is normally requested by the 
source and a journalist should normally try to get their sources on the record; 
confidentiality is a circumstance that should not be presumed.96 
Anderson has also shed doubt on the amount of protection journalists 
claim, but recognizes that some cases of confidential sources do present 
 
 90.  Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 1950, 1975. 
 91.  Anderson, supra note 55, at 900. 
 92.  Lillian R. BeVier, The Journalist’s Privilege-A Skeptic’s View, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
467, 478 (2006) (quoting Jeffrey Toobin, Name that Source, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, 
who quoted Martin Kaplan, Associate Dean of the University of Southern California’s Annenberg 
School for Communication).  
 93.  See Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed 
Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1063, 1119 (2006) (arguing for more self-restraint in the press to grant confidentiality 
condition to sources: “Journalists can go a long way toward winning public support to that effort if 
they stick to their pledges to stop promising anonymity freely. The combination of shield legislation 
and a stronger journalistic commitment to naming news sources might go a long way toward 
encouraging future Deep Throats while discouraging people who want to hide their names out of 
shame, not fear”). 
 94.  See Pearlstine, supra note 42, at 175. 
 95.  Id. at 243. 
 96.  Id. at 102. 
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concerns of the highest order, as the only means to maintain democratic 
accountability.97 
Nevertheless, the misuse of sources’ protection may not only occur due 
to negligence from the press, or manipulation from the sources. Recent 
scandals have shown that journalists might also look to shield themselves 
behind a reporter’s privilege for illegitimate purposes. 
Some “confidential sources” might in fact be a fabrication of a reporter 
to fool the public. This was the case of Jayson Blair,98 the New York Times 
reporter who plagiarized and fabricated articles attributing some of his 
biggest “scoops” to unnamed sources. A similar case was the one of Jack 
Kelly,99 the once-highly regarded USA Today reporter whose lies were 
uncovered in 2004. More recently, we can find the case of Liane Membis,100 
former intern for the Wall Street Journal, who was fired after evidence of 
fabrication of quotes101 and, of course, the very recent scandal of award-
winning journalist Claas Relotious,102 who invented stories and protagonists 
in at least 14 articles. 
Going back to the Valerie Plame case, a Los Angeles Times (LAT) 
editorial strongly criticized the role of The New York Times and of its reporter 
Judith Miller, who refused to reveal the identity of her source, went to jail, 
changed her mind after 85 days of imprisonment after obtaining a waiver of 
confidentiality by her source, Libby, who claimed to have given the waiver 
before Miller’s imprisonment. LAT stated that it was becoming clear that 
Miller had “abused the public’s trust by manufacturing a showdown with the 
government.”103 In a more general way, LAT recognized the role of 
anonymous sources but also highlighted the need to be careful in their 
treatment: “the credibility of such sources—and, by extension, of the 
 
 97.  Cf. Anderson, supra note 55, at 890. 
 98.  David Barstow, Jonathan D. Glater, Adam Liptak & Jacques Steinberg, Correcting the 
Record; Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trial of Deception, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/correcting-the-record-times-reporter-who-resign 
ed-leaves-long-trail-of-deception.html. 
 99.  Jacques Steinberg, USA Today Finds Top Writer Lied, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/20/us/usa-today-finds-top-writer-lied.html. 
 100.  Tyler Kingkade & Liane Membis, Fired Wall Street Journal Intern, Had Journalism 





 101.  Andrew Beaujon, Wall Street Journal intern fired for fabricating sources, POYNTER 
(June 26, 2012), https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2012/wall-street-journal-intern-fired-
for-making-up-sources/. 
 102.  Conolly, supra note 2. 
 103.  See Pearlstine, supra note 42, at 155. 
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newspapers that use them—can be hard to measure. Leakers are almost 
always motivated by something other than a commitment to the truth. When 
reporters agree to withhold a source’s name, they have an obligation to place 
the information they receive from that source in context. If journalists expect 
the public to take their work seriously, then they must be more careful about 
how they go about it.”104 
Although some would argue that a journalist must respect the source’s 
confidentiality even if the source uses that confidentiality for devious 
purposes,105 the damage of an improper grant of confidentiality reaches not 
only the source or the particular reporter, but also the journalistic profession 
and the media industry as a whole, which are regarded as incapable of being 
cautious and putting the public’s interest on top. 
The lack of accountability from the press might even push for more 
stringent regulations that could diminish its freedom.106 In this regard, 
BeVier argues that if the press has a constitutional conferred power to act on 
the public’s behalf, the public should then have a mechanism to hold the 
press accountable for the consequences of its performance.107 It is also 
possible that the quality of the information that the public receives is reduced 
when the press relies on confidential sources.108 The public has fewer 
opportunities to judge for itself the trustworthiness of the press reports.109 
Generally, state shield laws and the Free Flow of Information Act110—
the most recent federal shield legislation bill presented before the House of 
Representative—do not distinguish between the types of sources, between 
 
 104.  Editorial, Source of Frustration, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005. 
 105.  See Pearlstine, supra note 42, at 96 (referring to the case in which Marine colonel Oliver 
North accused members of the Congress of leaking classified information about the 1985 
apprehension of Arab terrorist, despite the fact that he was the leak himself. In this case, 
Newsweek’s journalist, Jonathan Alter revealed North as the leak, and this brought him criticism 
from investigative reporter Seymour Hersh). 
 106.  See Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 1978, 1984-85. Abramowicz suggests a hybrid 
solution to the lack of accountability. He proposes to use compliance of a news organization with 
its own guidelines on confidential sources as a mark of when to concede confidentiality or when to 
compel the disclosure of the source’s identity: “A journalist’s adherence to guidelines would weigh 
in favor of preserving a source’s confidentiality; an indifference to guidelines would weigh in favor 
of compelling disclosure of the source’s identity.” This approach, believes Abramowicz, solves the 
race-to-the-bottom problem. If the press fails to follow their own guidelines, they would be forced 
to disclose confidential sources’ identities. In the same manner, sources would only rely on 
guidelines-abiding newspapers. My objection to that proposal is that the race to the bottom might 
turn into the draft of the guidelines. Flexible guidelines might be the choice of the irresponsible and 
unaccountable press. 
 107.  BeVier, supra note 92, at 467. 
 108.  Id. at 478. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See infra note 144. 
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whistleblowers and wrongdoers, and do not make exceptions to sources’ 
protection in connection with the devious motives explored above. 
III.   Illegal Interception, Acquisition or Disclosure:  
An Exception to Shield Law to Make it Stronger 
Either under State Law, the First Amendment or Common Law, almost 
every state in the U.S., with the exception of Mississippi and Wyoming, 
recognizes a reporter’s privilege. Most states have also established, via 
statutory provisions or jurisprudence, some sort of balancing test, 
following—or very similar to: the one set in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Stewart in Branzburg, in order to determine whether the privilege is 
outweighed by other public interests. In other words, in order to defeat the 
reporter’s privilege, the requesting party must show: (1) That the reporter’s 
information is relevant to the litigation (or “goes to the heart of the party’s 
claim”); (2) that the information cannot be obtained by alternative means (or 
“the party has unsuccessfully exhausted all alternatives”); and (3) that there 
is a compelling interest in obtaining the information. 
State Shield Laws and the case law present some differences in the 
regulation of the reporter’s privilege concerning confidential or non-
confidential sources, published or unpublished information, and subpoenas 
in civil or criminal proceedings, or requested by a grand jury, that vary from 
state to state. But none of the State Shield Laws has considered the specific 
problem addressed by this paper, the case in which the confidentiality 
granted by a journalist protects a source who is also the perpetrator of an 
illegal interception in private communications. 
This is a very complicated situation that should be addressed by the 
statutes or the courts, especially in light of recent cases in which the press 
has been found to be actively taking part in the illegal interceptions. 
For instance, the News of the World phone-hacking scandal was initially 
believed to be the act of a rogue reporter, Glenn Mulcaire, then Royal Editor 
at the News of the World, in association with Clive Goodman, a private 
investigator who was paid to hack the phone of several celebrities and public 
figures, including employees of the royal household, and get the information 
needed to write his stories.111  However, after years of police investigation 
and news coverage, it was discovered that Rupert Murdoch’s tabloid had 
 
 111.  See HOUSE OF COMMONS. CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, I NEWS 
INTERNATIONAL AND PHONE-HACKING. ELEVENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2010-12 (2012), at 15 
(Mulcaire and Goodman were jointly charged with accessing the voicemails of three employees of 
the royal household. Mulcaire alone faced charges of accessing the voicemails of five further 
people: the publicist Max Clifford, sports agent Skylet Andrew, Professional Footballers’ 
Association Chief Executive Gordon Taylor, politician Simon Hughes MP, and model Elle 
MacPherson).  
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settled several cases with the people hacked, and also made a settlement with 
Mulcaire after his dismissal from News of the World. The tabloid even 
continued to pay Goodman. All these payments and settlements started to 
resemble a cover-up operation. 
In September 2010, a New York Times article quoted an ex-News of the 
World reporter, Sean Hoare, who said that phone-hacking was encouraged 
at the paper.112 
Between April and July 2011, more former employees of News of the 
World were arrested on suspicion of unlawfully intercepting voicemail 
messages and on suspicion of corruption to cover up the scandal, among 
them: reporters Ian Edmondson and Neville Thrulbeck (who worked for the 
News of the World for 21 years and was the newspaper’s Chief Reporter), 
James Weatherup, Andy Coulson (Editor of the News of the World from 
2003 until his resignation in January 2007, following the conviction of Clive 
Goodman),113 Neil Wallis (former News of the World editor) and Rebekah 
Brooks (former CEO of News International between September 2009 and 
July 2011, when she resigned; before that, she was Editor of the Sun from 
2003 and Editor of the News of the World from 2000).114 
All this led to Murdoch publicly announcing the closure of News of the 
World on July 2011, and admitting that the wrongdoing was not confined to 
one reporter.115 
In 2012, Sky News admitted that it authorized one of its reporters, 
Gerarad Tubb, to hack into the email account of John Darwin, a canoeist who 
“came back from the dead” and was jailed in 2008 for faking his death in a 
scheme to obtain £500,000 in pension and life insurance payouts.116 
The Chiquita Brands International case is another example of reporter’s 
misconduct. The Cincinnati Enquirer had published an 18-page special 
section about Chiquita’s “secrets,” accusing Chiquita Brands of improperly 
avoiding foreign laws that would limit the size of its banana plantation 
holdings, among other wrongdoings. The article was written by the 
investigative reporter Michael Gallagher. Although Gallagher first claimed 
that the sources for this reportage were leaked to him, later, Chiquita showed 
 
 112.  Don Van Natta Jr. et al., Tabloid hack attack on royals, and beyond, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 
5, 2010). 
 113.  He was later named Director of Communications for the Conservative Party in July 2007 
and in May 2010 was made Director of Communications for the Prime Minister, David Cameron. 
He resigned in January 2011. 
 114.  See HOUSE OF COMMONS. CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, I NEWS 
INTERNATIONAL AND PHONE-HACKING. ELEVENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2010-12 (2012). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Sky News Gave Reporters Permission to Hack Computer of ‘Canoe Man’ John Darwin, 
DAILY MAIL (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2125622/Sky-News-admits-
gave-reporters-permission-hack-computers.html#ixzz2IldLz1ac. 
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evidence that persuaded the newspaper that Gallagher had illegally 
penetrated the corporation’s voice mail system, a crime he finally 
confessed.117 
These cases are different from Bartnicki, in which the journalist was not 
involved in any form in the illegal interception of a private phone or 
electronic communication. It is also worth distinguishing that in Bartnicki, 
the source of the media, Yokum, was known to the police, although there 
was no information about the person responsible for the illegal wiretapping. 
What would have happened if the source in Bartnicki was unknown? Even 
though the Supreme Court held the press could not be punished for disclosing 
private and newsworthy information, would that have changed if the press 
did participate in the illegal procurement of the information? Would the press 
have a privilege to conceal its confidential source in that scenario? 
Only a few lower courts have addressed these concerns. Pearson v. 
Dodd is a case that predates Bartnicki. Sensational columnists Drew Pearson 
and Jack Anderson published papers taken from Senator Thomas Dodd’s 
office. The documentation showed an appropriation of campaign funds for 
personal use. Two then-current employees and two other former employees 
of Senator Dodd had taken the documents, photocopied them and turned 
them over to Anderson, who knew how they had been obtained. Senator 
Dodd sued for invasion of privacy, but Judge Wright in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals of the D.C. Circuit declared: “If we were to hold appellants [Pearson 
and Anderson] liable for invasion of privacy on these facts, we would 
establish the proposition that one who receives information from an intruder 
knowing it has been obtained by improper intrusion is guilty of a tort. In an 
untried and developing area of tort law, we are not prepared to go so far.”118 
In a similar analysis and outcome than in Bartinicki, the Court in 
Pearson reasoned that journalists can publish such information, provided 
that they do not take part on its illegal acquisition. However, this case was a 
close call because of the complicity between the journalists and the sources 
responsible for the intrusion. The previous knowledge and especially the 
previous contacts between the journalists and the intruding sources cast some 
doubts on whether the newsmen influenced the sources in procuring the 
information. 
The line was less blurry in Peavy v. WFAA-TV et al. Carver Dan Peavy 
was a trustee elected for the Dallas Independent School District (DISD). His 
phone conversations with third parties were intercepted by his neighbors, the 
Harmans, who met with a reporter and a news director from WFAA station, 
 
 117.  Cf. Teeter & Loving, supra note 18, at 486-87. 
 118.  Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Teeter & Loving, supra 
note 18, at 481-482. 
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and agreed that the Harmans would record the phone conversations and hand 
WFAA the tapes. Later, WFAA returned the tapes to Harman, but still 
broadcasted three reports on Peavy’s alleged wrongdoing in connection with 
DISD insurance, although the tapes were not played. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a reasonable jury could find that WFAA’s 
conduct (including meetings with the Harmans and instructions on how to 
record the conversations) constituted “obtaining” the Harmans to intercept 
Peavy’s conversations, in violation of the Texas Wiretap Act.119 
Beyond the cases in which a journalist or media outlet participated in 
the illegal intrusion of private communications, some courts have considered 
other risks associated with an absolute reporter’s privilege. For instance: 
How to prove actual malice in a defamation case in which a journalist claims 
that his remarks are supported by a confidential source? 
Zerilli v. Smith is a case in which the plaintiff attempted to obtain the 
deposition from reporters of Detroit News, who wrote an article depicting 
them as members of the mafia. Allegedly, the reporters had obtained this 
information from leaks within the Government. In spite of the plaintiff’s 
request, the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals refused to 
suppress the reporter’s privilege because the plaintiff had not exhausted all 
the resources to obtain the information about the alleged leaks. In dicta, the 
Court of Appeals shed light on the treatment of the reporter’s privilege when 
the reporter is a party to the litigation: “A distinction can also be drawn 
between civil cases in which the reporter is a party, as in a libel action, and 
cases in which the reporter is not a party. When the journalist is a party, and 
successful assertion of the privilege will effectively shield him from liability, 
the equities weigh somewhat more heavily in favor of disclosure. As we 
suggested in Carey v. Hume [internal citation omitted] this will be 
particularly true in libel cases involving public officials or public figures 
where the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [internal citation omitted], 
applies. Plaintiffs in those cases must prove both that the allegedly 
defamatory publication was false, and that it was made with ‘actual malice.’ 
Proof of actual malice will frequently depend on knowing the identity of the 
newspaper’s informant, since a plaintiff will have to demonstrate that the 
informant was unreliable and that the journalist failed to take adequate steps 
to verify his story. Protecting the identity of the source would effectively 
prevent recovery in many Times-type libel cases.”120 
The Court of Appeals made an important argument in Zerilli. Source’s 
anonymity can be deeply detrimental for a public official acting as a plaintiff 
in a defamation case, inasmuch as the malice requirement in some of those 
 
 119.  Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 171-72 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 120.  Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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cases might only be proved by having access to the source of the journalist’s 
defamatory publication. But even in that context, the Court stated that 
disclosure would not be immediate, insofar as other factors suggest that 
disclosure would be inappropriate, for example, when the information sought 
is not crucial.121 
In the Carey v. Hume case, referred in Zerilli, the concurring opinion 
by Judge MacKinnon highlighted the risks of a broad reporter’s immunity 
that would allow a journalist to hide “behind anonymous sources whenever 
sued.” By doing so, “an injured plaintiff attempting to prove his case would 
face a blank wall, with practically no opportunity to discover the identity of 
the alleged source upon which the defense claims reliance.” According to 
Judge MacKinnon, such immunity would be contrary to the public interest 
and against a responsible press.122 
A similar approach has been followed by the Georgia Court of Appeals 
at the state level, establishing in a defamation case that the language of the 
state shield law only provides the reporter’s privilege “where the one 
asserting the privilege is not a party.”123 The Supreme Court of Iowa has also 
ruled that the reporter’s privilege could be overridden in criminal matters and 
in civil cases “where a reporter asserting the privilege is a party to the lawsuit 
and his actions, motivations or thought processes are integral elements of the 
claim.”124 
Some courts like the California Supreme Court have also taken into 
consideration the special condition of the media as a defendant in civil cases 
to assess that the reporter’s privilege may be weaker than in criminal 
proceedings.125 The RCFP’s Reporter’s Privilege Guide also includes 
information of other states like Kansas, Massachussets, Michigan, 
Minnesota, South Carolina, Tennesse, and West Virginia, where the 
participation of a journalist as a party in a civil or criminal litigation, may tip 
the balance against the reporter’s privilege.126 
Another relevant case in which a Court made the “party distinction” is 
Mgmt Info. Techonologies v. Alyeska Pipeline. The case consisted of a 
lawsuit filed by Charles and Kathleen Hamel against the Alyseka Pipeline 
 
 121.  See also Driscoll v. Morris, 111 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Conn. 1986) (“A narrower 
application of the privilege, however, is appropriate in libel cases in order not to frustrate the policy 
of denying first amendment protection to libelous reports. Allowing defendant journalists to protect 
their sources (or their lack of sources) from judicial scrutiny simply by asserting that they based 
their stories on information from a reliable confidential source would undermine the role of libel 
liability as a check against media abuses.”). 
 122.  Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 123.  Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 180 (Ga. App. 2001). 
 124.  Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Iowa 1982). 
 125.  Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 631 (Cal. 1984). 
 126.  The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An Introduction, supra note 62. 
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Corporation and others, for diverse violations of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and 
other claims including invasion of privacy, trespass, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of Mr. Hamel’s 
reporting of Alyeska’s environmental abuses, Alyeska and the other 
defendants embarked on a scheme “to obtain information and documents in 
the Hamels’ possession and to prevent, through intimidation, Charles Hamel 
and his sources from reporting serious environmental wrongdoing by 
Alyeska” to the respective governmental entities. 
The ruling that is of interest for the present study concerns the protective 
order requested by Patti Epler, a reporter for the Tacoma News in Tacoma, 
who got in touched and allegedly handed confidential information to Charles 
Hamel concerning Alyeska. Alyeska then sought to depose Ms. Epler to 
determine the content of that information.127 
The Court granted the protective order preventing the deposition of Ms. 
Epler after recognizing a reporter’s privilege. In doing so, the Court 
distinguished between cases in which the reporter is a party from others in 
which the reporter is not. Thus, following the criteria established in Zerilli, 
the Court found no justification for requiring Ms. Espler to provide the 
requested documents or to testify in deposition, as she was not a party in the 
case and the information requested did not involve the heart of the matter of 
the case.128 
In this case, it was also discussed whether a reporter presumably 
involved in illegal acquisition of information would impede the application 
of the reporter’s privilege. Even though the Court did not set a clear rule on 
whether that exception would apply, the Court found that there was no 
evidence of the presumed illegality on the side of Ms. Epler. The Court, 
relying on FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,129 held that simple 
possession of copies of documents—as opposed to the documents 
themselves—does not amount to an interference with the owner’s property 
sufficient to constitute conversion, absent evidence that the news 
organization has deprived the document’s owner of use of the document.130 
In all of the cases reviewed so far, the Courts failed to find a connection 
between the press and the illegal intruders strong enough to establish some 
degree of responsibility on the press or any limitations on the reporter’s 
privilege. A more recent case, Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, shows that 
 
 127.  Mgmt. Info. Technologies, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 151 F.R.D. 471, 473-74 
(D.D.C. 1993). 
 128.  Id. at 477. 
 129.  FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 915 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir.1990). 
 130.  Mgmt. Info. Technologies, 151 F.R.D. 471, 475 (D.D.C. 1993). 
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unless a special level of involvement from the press is showed, the Bartincki 
rule would stand. In Jean, a man recorded a warrantless search conducted in 
his house by the police and gave it to Jean who posted the recording on her 
website. The state police threatened to prosecute Jean under the State’s 
eavesdropping statue. The First Circuit recognized that Jean, unlike Yocum 
in Bartnicki, knew who made the allegedly illegal recording, but this fact 
only made the State’s interest in prosecuting a subsequent publisher (Jean 
and Vopper in the respective cases) even weaker, because when the existence 
of an interceptor is known, he can be directly prosecuted by the State.131 In 
other words, according to the court, there would be no need to establish 
responsibility on the press when the alleged criminal source (or at least its 
existence) is known. 
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court132 is one of 
the few cases in which a court has made the connection between the 
reporter’s privilege and the involvement of a reporter in unlawful 
newsgathering. 
This case presents the petition of ADL and others to vacate the 
discovery ordered by the Superior Court pertaining to non-public 
information obtained by ADL from public agents regarding real parties 
(plaintiffs). ADL was an organization dedicated to several activities 
including journalism. Real parties had sued them for gathering and 
disclosing personal information about them, 17 individuals, in violation of 
Civil Code section 1798.53, in reprisal to their expressed views in opposition 
to the apartheid policy of the then-government of South Africa and/or Israeli 
policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians.133 
Real parties argued that ADL’s claim of First Amendment immunity 
(reporter’s privilege) did not apply because their newsgathering techniques 
were unlawful and fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection. 
However, the Court rejected this argument, stating: “We do not believe the 
alleged unlawfulness of petitioners’ information-gathering activities is 
dispositive of their right to the protection of the First Amendment. Petitioners 
would be entitled to that protection even if they did violate the statute, but 
only if they obtained, used and disseminated the information at issue as 
journalists.”134 
This statement would appear to indicate that the Court believed that 
unlawful newsgathering would not trump the reporter’s privilege. However, 
when determining the kind of newsgathering techniques that would not be 
 
 131.  See Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 31-33 (1st Cir. 2007). See also 
Franklin et al., supra note 19, at 424. 
 132.  Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (1998). 
 133.  Id. at 1078. 
 134.  Id. at 1091. 
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protected by the First Amendment, the Court went back to cases like 
Dietemann, in which the use of a hidden camera and electronic devices was 
held not to be protected by the First Amendment.135 Therefore, the Court’s 
reasoning in Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith is itself contradictory 
because Dietemann is precisely a case of unlawful newsgathering.136 In other 
words, for the Court, unlawful newsgathering would indeed trump the 
reporter’s privilege. 
The Court also considered the manner in which petitioners used and 
disseminated the information, stating that such activity could fall off the 
typical journalistic practice, and therefore, would not qualify for the First 
Amendment protection. For that reason, the Court partially limited the 
discovery order in favor of the real parties specifically to learn whether any 
information gathered about them by ADL and its agents in violation of Civil 
Code section 1798.53 was disclosed to the government of Israel or South 
Africa, or to any other agency or individual not a member of or employed by 
ADL, or to any individual who was then a member or employee of ADL, but 
for a non-journalistic purpose.137 
Despite the Court’s highlighted contradictions, its ruling is one of the 
very few that truly reflects the importance of proper journalistic activities in 
order to maintain the reporter’s privilege. When there is evidence of 
improper journalistic methods, like involvement in the illegal intrusion or 
acquisition of information contained in private communications, the 
reporter’s privilege would have to give way to the interest of other parties or 
the Government in investigating illegal conducts. 
As stated before, there is a growing number of cases in which the media 
is found to be engaged in improper newsgathering that involve illegal 
activities performed by third parties, who ended up being the journalists’ 
sources. Despite this trend, the case law is very limited in showing a 
limitation to the reporter’s privilege in this scenario, which would help 
governmental investigators and civil parties to prosecute illegal intruders. 
From a statutory perspective, very few State Shield Laws have 
addressed, even indirectly, this problem. The Oregon State Shield Law, for 
instance, establishes that the reporter’s privilege does not apply when there 
is probable cause to believe that the reporter has committed, is committing 
or will commit a crime.138 Similarly, in New Jersey the exception to the 
privilege would take place when a reporter has been an eyewitness or has 
been a participant in an act involving physical violence or property 
 
 135.  See supra note 72, and accompanying text. 
 136.  Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (1998). 
 137.  Id. at 1094. 
 138.  Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44.520 (LexisNexis). 
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damage.139 However, there is no specification on whether the act of violence 
or property damage has to be connected with newsgathering activities. 
Texas Shield Law also contemplates a similar exception to the privilege 
based on three situations:140 (i) When a journalist was an eyewitness to a 
felony; (ii) when the journalist received a confession of the commission a 
felony; and (iii) when probable causes exists that the source committed a 
felony, which could include the illegal interception of private 
communications. On a similar note, Louisiana’s Supreme Court established 
an exception to the reporter’s privilege in the event that a reporter has 
witnessed a criminal activity or has physical evidence of a crime.141 
Likewise, North Carolina has stated that a journalist has no privilege when 
he was an eye-witness to criminal or tortious conduct.142 
Virginia State establishes two exceptions regarding reporters 
privilege:143 (i) When a reporter has personally witnessed a crime or (ii) when 
a reporter has participated in a crime, regardless of the promise of 
confidentiality to the source. 
At the federal level, a new bill was introduced into the House of 
Representatives by Congressman Jamie Raskin on December 13, 2017.144 
The Federal Free Flow of Information Act (FFIA) of 2017 is basically the 
same legislation that Mike Pence co-sponsored in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 
2011.145 
The FFIA, however, advances on addressing a possible exception for 
the cases in which the press’ sources may be involved in illegal acquisition 
or disclosure of private information. According to the bill, a compelled 
disclosure may occur if it is necessary to identify a person who has disclosed: 
A trade secret;146 individually identifiable health information;147 nonpublic 
personal information;148 properly classified information, in which such 
unauthorized disclosure has caused or will cause significant and articulable 
harm to the national security.149 Additionally, Section 2(e) includes an 
exception to the reporter’s privilege when a criminal or tortious conduct is 
 
 139.  N.J. Stat. § 2A:84A-21a (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through New Jersey 218th Second 
Annual Session, L. 2019, c. 240, and J.R. 19). This exception is narrowly constructed: a reporter 
cannot be compelled to testify if there are other witnesses to the crime. 
 140.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.11. 
 141.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 520 So. 2d 372, 373 (La. February 29, 1988). 
 142.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.11. 
 143.  United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492, (4th Cir. 2013). 
 144.  Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017-2018). 
 145.  Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 2932, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 146.  H.R. 4382, §2(a)(3)(C)(i). 
 147.  Id. at §2(a)(3)(C)(ii). 
 148.  Id. at §2(a)(3)(C)(iii). 
 149.  Id. at §2(a)(3)(D)(i). 
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committed by the reporter himself, provided that the party seeking the 
disclosure has exhausted all reasonable alternatives for obtaining the 
required information. Although this last provision does not make an explicit 
specification, it could be applicable to the cases in which the media has 
participated in the illegal interception or acquisition of private information 
(a criminal act under Federal Law and most State Laws). 
The FFIA is troubling inasmuch as it establishes a large number of 
exceptions to the reporter’s privilege, many of which would chill a source 
from actually talking to a reporter. Much of the information that is revealed 
to a journalist under a promise of confidentiality involves a breach of 
secrecy, but under FFIA, the reporter would be compelled to reveal the 
source’s identity. 
While it is true that there is an important public interest in discovering 
and eventually prosecuting the people who intruded in a private 
communication or violated a confidentiality obligation, the costs of doing so 
by not protecting the conversation between a journalist and his source would 
be too burdensome. The role of the free press should not be affected by the 
State’s interest in discovering illegal activities, nor should we charge the 
press with a quasi-official investigative role that is incompatible to its core. 
The only case in which it would be justifiable to trump the reporter’s 
privilege is when that privilege has been used by the journalist to engage—
himself—in an illegal practice and then conceal it under the “shield” of said 
privilege. This is precisely the type of ill incentives that a broad reporter’s 
immunity could cause: Journalists and illegal intruders working together in 
the illegal hacking or interception of private communications under the 
protection of a legal immunity that would prevent the authorities from 
discovering the origin of the invasion of the victim’s privacy. 
Conclusion 
Reporters should not carry the burden of the illegalities executed by 
their sources, but neither should they enjoy a carte blanche to engage in 
illegal intrusions in someone’s privacy for the purpose of newsgathering. We 
can accept reporters as involuntary beneficiaries of illegally obtained 
information but we do not want them to participate in both sides of the supply 
and demand market for that information. If a journalist actively participated 
in the illegal interception of private communications, he is no longer acting 
as an innocent reporter deserving of a protection for his sources. 
If we want to properly defend the press’ freedom and to protect the 
correct use of the reporter’s privilege, it is fundamental to exclude the cases 
in which reporters disregard its legal (and ethical) obligations. 
Reporters should be given enough space to gather news but not at any 
cost. Total immunity and lack of accountability has been damaging the image 
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of the press. By putting more weight on the side of those who are harmed by 
illegal intruders and by putting some limitations and exposing journalists that 
engage in malpractice, we are preventing journalists from future stricter 
regulations, and guaranteeing more freedom for a responsible press. 
 
